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CONGRESS’S LIMITED POWER TO
ENFORCE TREATIES
Michael D. Ramsey*
This Article focuses on Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment in
Bond v. United States.1 It makes three main points. First, Scalia’s claim that
Congress lacks a general power to enforce treaties is unpersuasive as a matter
of the Constitution’s original meaning. Congress’s power to enact laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the treatymaking power can be
read to include the power to enforce treaties because treatymaking and treaty
enforcement are inevitably intertwined. As the Framers understood from
experience, a nation with a reputation for unreliable treaty enforcement
would be impaired in its ability to make future treaties, as potential partners
would regard it as untrustworthy. Further, Scalia’s claim rests strongly on the
structural point that giving Congress treaty enforcement power would
expand the federal government’s power without limit. But this structural
point is overstated, both because treatymaking itself is constrained by the
need for supermajority Senate consent and because federal power can be
exercised through self-executing treaties regardless of limits on Congress.
Indeed, structural considerations cut at least as strongly the other way, for it
seems unlikely after the experiences of the Articles of Confederation that the
Framers would have accepted a category of treaties whose enforcement could
not be assured at the national level.
Second, Scalia’s structural concerns about effectively unlimited congressional power are nonetheless partly justified to the extent that courts substantially defer to Congress’s claims about what action is necessary and proper to
enforce a treaty. If Congress alone can decide what a treaty means and what
its enforcement requires, Congress may use the treaty to claim powers not
© 2015 Michael D. Ramsey. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Faculty Director of
International and Comparative Law Programs, University of San Diego Law School.
Thanks to William Dodge, Duncan Hollis, David Moore, Saikrishna Prakash, Michael
Rappaport, and David Sloss for helpful comments and discussions, and to Joseph Mellano
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1 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2094–102 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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contemplated by the treatymakers. Congress could thus invoke the treaty
while circumventing the supermajority constraint on treatymaking.
Third, therefore, courts should not defer fully to Congress in this matter; instead, they should assure that Congress’s actions do not exceed what is
justified by the treaty. Although Congress has power to pass laws necessary
and proper to preserve the United States’ reputation for treaty compliance,
Congress must use this power in ways that do not unduly infringe federalism.
In particular, this Article suggests two types of judicial limitations. Courts can
make an independent assessment of the meaning of the treaty, including
employing a presumption that treaties do not affect purely domestic matters.
Courts can also review the necessity and propriety of Congress’s enforcement
legislation, prominently including in this assessment whether enforcement of
the treaty is appropriately done at the federal rather than the state level. As a
result, Congress’s power to enforce treaties, while broad, need not be
unlimited.
As an illustration, application of this approach in Bond v. United States
would find the federal legislation (as applied to Bond) beyond Congress’s
power, both because the Chemical Weapons Convention did not reach
Bond’s conduct and because even if it did, state regulation was adequate to
assure U.S. compliance with the Convention. As a result, although Congress
has power to enforce treaties (contrary to Justice Scalia’s view), its power is
sufficiently limited so that it does not pose an undue threat to federalism.
I. CONGRESS’S POWER

TO

ENFORCE TREATIES

Concurring in the judgment in Bond v. United States, Justice Scalia
(joined by Justice Thomas) argued that a federal statute implementing a
treaty, if not otherwise within the powers of Congress, is unconstitutional:
Since the Act is clear, the real question this case presents is whether the
Act is constitutional as applied to petitioner. An unreasoned and citationless sentence from our opinion in Missouri v. Holland purported to furnish
the answer: “If the treaty is valid”—and no one argues that the Convention is
not—“there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article
I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.” Petitioner and her amici press us to consider whether there is anything to this ipse dixit. The Constitution’s text and structure show that there
is not.2

As Scalia’s assessment makes clear, the core question is whether Congress’s “necessary and proper” power extends to statutes that enforce treaties.
The Court’s assumption in Missouri v. Holland (and Scalia is right that it is
just an assumption) was that (a) the treaty power is a power of the federal
government; (b) Congress has the power to “carry into execution” the powers of the federal government; and (c) legislation that enforces a treaty provi2 Id. at 2098 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 432 (1920)).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-4\NDL405.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 3

14-MAY-15

congress’s limited power to enforce treaties

14:38

1541

sion carries into execution the treaty power.3 Scalia makes a twofold
counterargument, based on text and structure. In this Part, I argue that he is
unpersuasive on both counts.
A. Text
Following Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz’s pathbreaking article,4 Scalia
argues that the Constitution’s text—the combination of the treatymaking
clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause—does not give blanket treaty
enforcement power to Congress. As Scalia puts it:
Under Article I, § 8, cl. 18, Congress has the power “[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” One
such “other Powe[r]” appears in Article II, § 2, cl. 2: “[The President] shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” Read
together, the two Clauses empower Congress to pass laws “necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the] Power . . . to make Treaties.”5

This power, he continues, is only to assist in making treaties, not to assist
in the very different enterprise of enforcing them:
3 See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. Holland concerned the validity of a statute regulating
hunting of migratory birds, enacted on the authority of a treaty protecting migratory birds.
Id. at 431. The sentence Scalia quotes from Holland is the only discussion in the opinion of
the validity of the statute; the balance of the opinion addresses the validity of the treaty.
4 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1879
(2005) [hereinafter Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power]; see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Bond v. United States: Can the President Increase Congress’s Legislative Power by Entering
into a Treaty?, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 228, 235 (2013) [hereinafter Rosenkranz, Bond v.
United States] (discussing the article’s application to Bond); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
Bond v. United States: Concurring in the Judgment, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 285, 295 [hereinafter Rosenkranz, Concurring in the Judgment] (same). For related commentary, see generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390
(1998) (expressing concern for federalism implications of the treaty power); John C. Eastman, Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 185 (endorsing
federalism limits on Congress’s treaty enforcement power). For counterarguments, see
David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1278–313 (2000) (criticizing Professor
Bradley’s approach); Edward T. Swaine, Putting Missouri v. Holland on the Map, 73 MO. L.
REV. 1007 (2008) (criticizing Professor Rosenkranz’s approach); Carlos Manuel Vázquez,
Missouri v. Holland’s Second Holding, 73 MO. L. REV. 939, 942–64 (2008) (considering and
rejecting both the Rosenkranz and Bradley approaches); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1810 (2009) (concluding that “Congress may enact by statute, pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause,
whatever domestic legal rules the President, acting together with the Senate, could have
enacted by self-executing treaty”). This Article directly addresses Justice Scalia’s concurrence and does not assess all of the arguments advanced by Professor Rosenkranz and
other academic commentators.
5 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2098 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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A treaty is a contract with a foreign nation made, the Constitution states, by
the President with the concurrence of “two thirds of the Senators present.” . . . So, because the President and the Senate can enter into a non-selfexecuting compact with a foreign nation but can never by themselves (without the House) give that compact domestic effect through legislation, the
power of the President and the Senate “to make” a Treaty cannot possibly
mean to “enter into a compact with a foreign nation and then give that compact domestic legal effect.” . . . Upon the President’s agreement and the
Senate’s ratification, a treaty—no matter what kind—has been made and is
not susceptible of any more making.6

As a result, the power to carry into execution the treatymaking power
includes things such as appropriating money and appointing officers to carry
out negotiations. But “[o]nce a treaty has been made, Congress’s power to
do what is ‘necessary and proper’ to assist the making of treaties drops out of
the picture. To legislate compliance with the United States’ treaty obligations, Congress must rely upon its independent (though quite robust) Article
I, § 8, powers.”7
While this is a possible reading of the text, it does not appear to be the
only one. Instead, treatymaking and treaty compliance might be seen as
intertwined rather than (as Scalia sees them) entirely distinct. Treaties, as
reciprocal agreements among nations, depend upon the willingness and ability of their signatories to abide by their provisions. If a nation is unable or
unwilling to satisfy its obligations, and this is generally known by other
nations, its treatymaking power will be greatly impaired. Other nations will
be reluctant to contract with an unreliable partner.
This connection may be most easily seen by analogy to private contracts.
In business relationships, a firm’s reputation for honoring its contracts is
essential to continued business. A firm that gains a reputation for breaching
its existing contracts will have few opportunities to make new ones. As a
result, the firm’s willingness and ability to uphold existing contractual obligations is closely related to its opportunities to enter into new contractual relationships. In the treaty context, this effect is even more powerful, because
there is no external enforcement mechanism comparable to courts’ enforcement of private contracts. At least a firm entering into a contract with an
unreliable partner has some hope that a court will enforce the contract
(albeit after considerable time and expense). Treaty parties, in contrast,
have no equivalent enforcement mechanism and so must place even greater
value upon the reliability of their prospective treaty partner.8
As a result, it seems plausible to say that Congress’s treaty enforcement
carries into effect the President’s treatymaking power, because absent reliable methods of enforcement, the power to make treaties as a practical matter
6 Id. at 2098–99.
7 Id. at 2099; see also Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, supra note 4, at 1880–92
(making the same argument).
8 See generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS (2010) (stressing
the importance of reputation in international law compliance).
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would be greatly impaired. Scalia’s opinion, although it describes Congress’s
power as “a power to help the President make treaties,”9 does not discuss this
reading of the text.
Scalia offers no direct evidence that the Founding generation read the
text as he does.10 Context suggests that they would have embraced the
broader view.
For the Framers, the need to establish trust among potential treaty partners was an immediate concern. Under the Articles of Confederation, the
national Congress could enter into treaties but had little power to enact laws
to enforce treaties;11 for enforcement requiring domestic legislation, action
by the states was needed. The states proved unreliable, repeatedly failing to
take action to enforce treaties.12 The most notorious of these difficulties
involved the 1783 peace treaty with Britain, which provided that British creditors would not be prevented from enforcing and collecting prewar debts.13
The states, of course, did interfere with British enforcement and collection,
ignoring the treaty, and the Congress was powerless to rectify the situation.14
Although the issue of the British debts is well known, it was only part of a
more pervasive problem. The United States undertook substantial treaty
commitments soon after independence, entering into treaties with France,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Prussia, and Morocco, as well as with Britain.15 As
John Jay recounted in a report to the Congress, states frequently ignored
treaty provisions, either violating them outright or failing to enforce them,
leading to widespread protests by foreign nations.16 This was a problem in
9 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2099 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
omitted).
10 In addition to what he believes is the text’s plain meaning, Scalia relies on inferences from structure and more general Founding-era commentary. These points are discussed below in Section I.B.
11 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX (describing powers of the Continental Congress).
12 See FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–95 (1973) (describing difficulties with treaty enforcement
under the Articles); David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International
Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7, 9–12 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011) (same).
13 Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
14 See MARKS, supra note 12, at 5–15; Sarah H. Cleveland & William S. Dodge, Defining
and Punishing Offenses Under Treaties, 124 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 17
n.69).
15 Cleveland & Dodge, supra note 14 (manuscript at 16–17).
16 See 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 781–874 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934) (report by Foreign Secretary Jay describing state violations of treaties
and foreign countries’ responses to those violations); 3 THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE SIGNING OF THE DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE
TO THE ADOPTION OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION, 1783–1789, at 437–42 (1837) (note from
Dutch minister to Jay protesting violations of a United States-Netherlands treaty); see also
MARKS, supra note 12, at 151 (“Congressional files contained legal complaints from every
nation to which the country was bound by treaty.”). Indeed, the Continental Congress
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part because it contributed to bad relations with existing treaty partners
(especially with Britain). Importantly for the present discussion, Jay also
reported that foreign nations were reluctant to enter into further treaties
with the United States because of the problem of treaty enforcement.17 The
historical record bears this out—after an initial flurry of treatymaking following independence, the United States was unable to conclude additional treaties despite aggressive diplomatic efforts.18 As Hamilton explained:
No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association [under the
Articles] would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United
States, conceding on their part privileges of importance, while they were
apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union might at any
moment be violated by its members.19

A central goal of the Constitutional Convention was to remedy this gap
between treatymaking power and treaty enforcement power.20
A possible response is that the Constitution solved the problem of treaty
enforcement in another way—by making treaties the “supreme Law of the
Land” in Article VI and granting federal courts jurisdiction over their
enforcement in Article III (what we now call treaty self-execution).21 Thus
prospective treaty partners could be assured of enforcement because treaties
(like contracts) could be enforced directly in court.
expressed concerns about treaty violations as early as 1781 (before the peace with Britain)
when it adopted a resolution calling on states to adopt laws “to provide expeditious, exemplary and adequate punishment” for (among other things) “infractions of treaties and conventions to which the United States are a party.” 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra, at 1136–37; see also Cleveland & Dodge, supra note 14 (manuscript at
19–22) (discussing the 1781 Resolution).
17 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 16, at 781–874.
18 See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 12, at 66–67 (recounting Adams’s inability to negotiate a
new treaty with Britain in 1785, in part due to British belief that Congress could not
enforce a treaty); id. at 67 n.28 (recounting a British diplomat’s observation in 1785 that
“the apparent determination of the respective states to regulate their own separate interests renders it absolutely necessary . . . that my court should be informed how far the [U.S.]
commissioners can be duly authorized to enter into any engagements with Great Britain
which it may not be in the power of any one of the states to render totally fruitless and
ineffectual”); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 433 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (statement of James Wilson) (“What is the reason that Great Britain
does not enter into a commercial treaty with us? Because [C]ongress has not the power to
enforce its observance.”); Vázquez, supra note 4, at 947 n.41 (collecting similar statements
from the drafting and ratification period).
19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
20 See Cleveland & Dodge, supra note 14 (manuscript at 22–28); Sloss, Ramsey &
Dodge, supra note 12, at 9–12. See generally David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A
Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010).
21 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 19, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of
the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be
ascertained by judicial determinations.”).
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It seems clear that the inclusion of treaties in Article VI and Article III
was designed to have that effect.22 However, the creation of self-executing
treaties did not eliminate the need for treaty enforcement by statute. Some
matters—such as providing criminal punishments—are difficult to do by
treaty (among other things, because of differences in legal systems and the
need to describe criminal offenses precisely).23 Sometimes diplomatic realities require that treaties be somewhat open-ended and leave implementation
to the parties.24 As a result, Congress would still have an important role in
treaty enforcement. To the extent that that role was constrained (by limiting
it to Congress’s otherwise enumerated powers) the U.S. treatymaking power
would be constrained.25
22 See Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1450, 1470 (2006) (discussing the role of Article VI in treaty enforcement).
23 Indeed, modern law arguably holds (or at least assumes) that criminal punishments
cannot be imposed directly by treaty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. i (1987) (“[I]t has been assumed that an international agreement creating an international crime (e.g., genocide) or requiring states parties to punish certain actions (e.g., hijacking) could not itself become part of the criminal
law of the United States, but would require Congress to enact an appropriate statute before
an individual could be tried or punished for the offense.”); see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 203 (2d ed. 1996) (“A treaty, it is accepted,
cannot itself enact criminal law . . . .”); Cleveland & Dodge, supra note 14 (manuscript at
40 n.187) (“Today it is accepted that a treaty generally cannot create a crime
directly . . . .”). Regardless of the soundness of the modern view as an original matter, it is
in any event true that treaties typically do not directly specify punishments.
24 Treaties very commonly provide in general terms that treaty parties shall prohibit
certain conduct and leave the details of the prohibition to implementing legislation. For
example, the treaty at issue in Bond, the Chemical Weapons Convention, provides only that
parties “shall prohibit” certain individual conduct. Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction art. VII(1)(a), opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21,
1974 U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]. The treaty in Missouri v. Holland provided only that the parties would enact regulations to protect migratory birds. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920)
(discussing the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16,
1916, 39 Stat. 1702). Relatedly, a treaty might not specify any method of enforcement and
thus implicitly leave to the parties the choice of enforcement methods. For example, the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations requires parties to allow a noncitizen who is
arrested in their territory to contact that person’s consulate for assistance. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. States
have routinely violated that provision when arresting foreign nationals. The Supreme
Court concluded that the Convention itself does not require a remedy akin to the exclusionary rule to enforce the Convention. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 332
(2006). Instead the Court assumed that Congress has power to enforce the Convention in
the manner it chooses. Id.
25 This argument is particularly powerful if one views Congress’s spending power as
limited to its enumerated powers. Most people agree that a treaty cannot appropriate
money to carry itself into effect. If Congress could not spend money in support of treaties,
other than treaties within its enumerated powers, a considerable gap in implementation
would exist.
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In sum, the text on its face does not support Scalia’s narrow reading.
The power to make treaties requires more than simply money and personnel
to negotiate their terms. It also requires ways to assure potential treaty partners that treaty obligations will be honored. To be sure, a central response to
this concern was Article VI. But Article VI is not a complete response. As a
result, when Congress passes laws to implement or enforce a treaty, it is acting in support of the treatymaking power.
This is not to say that Scalia’s reading is an impossible reading of the
text. But Scalia argues that the opposing position “makes no pretense of
resting on text.”26 To the contrary, a textual argument for Congress’s treaty
enforcement power is possible and—particularly in light of the Founding
generation’s concerns about treaty enforcement—persuasive.27
B. Structure
Justice Scalia’s stronger argument against Congress’s treaty enforcement
power is structural—that if recognized, it will destroy the idea of enumerated
powers:
“[T]he Constitutio[n] confer[s] upon Congress . . . not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones.” Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 919 (1997). And, of course, “enumeration presupposes something
not enumerated.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 195 (1824).
But in Holland, the proponents of unlimited congressional power found
a loophole: “By negotiating a treaty and obtaining the requisite consent of
the Senate, the President . . . may endow Congress with a source of legislative
26 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Scalia’s concurrence did not address a possible alternative textual argument
that Congress’s power to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, includes the power to enforce treaties (which in the eighteenth
century were sometimes described as a subset of the law of nations). See Cleveland &
Dodge, supra note 14 (manuscript at 8–33) (making this argument); Vázquez, supra note
4, at 951–52 (same). Even if Congress’s power under the Offenses Clause conveys some
power over treaty enforcement (and Professors Cleveland and Dodge provide strong
originalist arguments for this view), the power would likely not be sufficient to assure treaty
compliance in all cases. While some treaties impose obligations directly on individuals,
many treaties (especially non-self-executing treaties) address the political branches. For
example, in the classic non-self-execution case Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), Chief
Justice Marshall concluded that a treaty obligation that certain land grants in formerly
Spanish territory “shall be ratified and confirmed” imposed only an obligation on Congress
to pass legislation confirming the grants. Id. at 313–15. No individual action could plausibly be said to constitute an “offense” against such an obligation, since it did not require
individuals to take any action. Thus it is hard to see how the Offenses Clause could give
Congress power to enforce the treaty; yet if Congress failed to confirm the titles, the
United States would be in breach of the treaty.
27 There is also evidence that post-ratification practice reflects recognition of Congress’s treaty enforcement power. See Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in
Historical Practice, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 59, 64 (2014) (discussing congressional reliance
on treaty enforcement power in enacting legislation).
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authority independent of the powers enumerated in Article I.” L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 4–4, pp. 645–646 (3d ed. 2000).28

It is true that recognizing a congressional treaty enforcement power
would expand—perhaps dramatically—Congress’s enumerated powers. The
question is whether this result is so problematic that we must conclude the
Framers could not have designed it. Several considerations suggest the
contrary.
First, as Justice Thomas argued in a separate concurrence, treaties are by
the eighteenth-century definition agreements among nations on matters of
international concern.29 Thus, the treaty power, though broad, is not unlimited. The specter of a sham treaty—by which the U.S. government expands
its domestic regulatory power via a pseudo-agreement with a nation having
no interest in the matter—should not be given great weight.30 While the
scope of matters of international concern has broadened significantly since
the eighteenth century,31 it is not all-encompassing.
Second, unless the treatymaking power is itself limited to Congress’s
enumerated powers, the Constitution’s provision for self-executing treaties
already permits the national government to invade the otherwise reserved
powers of the states through treatymaking. Recognizing Congress’s enforce28 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2099 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (alterations in original); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 645–46 (3d ed.
2000)); see also Rosenkranz, Bond v. United States, supra note 4, at 231 (“If a treaty could
increase the legislative power of Congress, then the constitutional axiom of limited federal
power would be a sham.”); Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, supra note 4, at 1893–94
(“Needless to say, th[e] proposition [that treaties can be used to expand legislative authority] is in deep tension with the basic constitutional scheme of enumerated legislative powers, and it stands contradicted by countless canonical statements that the powers of
Congress are fixed and defined.”).
29 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. id. at 2098
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the U.S. government could overturn federalism precedents for example “by negotiating a treaty with Latvia providing that
neither sovereign would permit the carrying of guns near schools”).
30 See Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism, 73 MO. L. REV.
969, 978–79 (2008) (“Article II, Section 2 does seem to require that powers claimed under
the treatymaking clause must be exercised through something that really is a ‘treaty,’ in
the eighteenth-century meaning of the word. ‘Treaty’ meant (as it means today) an agreement among nations on matters of mutual interest. As a result, exercises of treatymaking
power must actually involve an agreement, an international matter, and interest on the
part of both nations. The clause thus would reject sham treaties, where the President and
the Senate combined to end-run the legislative process for purely domestic reasons, convincing a foreign nation to sign the resulting document to achieve the look of a treaty
without any of a treaty’s substance.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Alexander Hamilton, The
Defence No. XXXVI (Jan. 2, 1796), in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3, 6 (Harold
C. Syrett ed., 1974) (acknowledging this limit in an essay otherwise devoted to arguing the
broad scope of the treatymaking power).
31 Justice Thomas suggested in his concurrence in Bond that the scope of the
treatymaking power should extend only to those matters that were of international concern in the eighteenth century. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment). The argument here does not depend on that view, which I find unpersuasive.
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ment power would be only a marginal addition to federal power, not (in
Scalia’s word) a “seismic”32 shift.
Some scholars have argued that the treatymaking power itself is limited
to Congress’s enumerated powers. That is, they contend that there is an
implicit limit on Article II, Section 2, parallel to Article I, Section 8. The
principal argument for this proposition is that any other result would destroy
enumerated powers by allowing the President and Senate to create domestic
legislation (in the form of a judicially enforceable treaty) on any topic.33
However, as I have argued elsewhere,34 neither text, history, nor structure
supports this proposition. Nothing in the text suggests a subject matter limitation on treatymaking35 and Founding-era history indicates a general
(though not universal) understanding that treatymaking was not limited by
subject matter.36 It is plausible to believe that the Framers protected against
overreaching treaties in another structural way—by requiring treaties to gain
approval of two-thirds of the Senate, when the Senators were appointed by
the state legislatures.37
In any event, if treaties themselves cannot exceed Congress’s enumerated powers, the question of Congress’s treaty enforcement power is moot,
because Congress will never be in a position to enforce a treaty beyond its
enumerated powers. The structural question of Congress’s treaty enforcement power is significant only if we assume (as I believe to be correct) that
treaties can act upon subjects beyond Congress’s enumerated powers.
If that is so, however, the grant of treaty enforcement power to Congress
is not so great a threat to the constitutional structure as Scalia suggests. The
federal government as a whole is not limited to lawmaking within Congress’s
enumerated powers. Congress’s treaty enforcement power presupposes a
valid treaty—that is, one approved under the federalism-protective regime of
two-thirds Senate approval. In a sense, adding congressional enforcement is
an additional protection for federalism. While a self-executing treaty creates
law through the President and two-thirds of the Senate, a non-self-executing
treaty enforced by Congress creates law through the President, two-thirds of
the Senate, and a majority of the House.
Justice Scalia’s rhetoric in Bond often ignores this point. He says, for
example, that under the broad view of Congress’s treaty enforcement power,
“the possibilities of what the Federal Government may accomplish, with the
32
33

Id. at 2099 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
See, e.g., HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1915); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 14–15; see also Cato [Robert Livingston], Observations on Mr. Jay’s Treaty, No. XVI, reprinted in 3 THE AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER
63, 63–67 (Matthew Carey ed., Philadelphia, Henry Tuckniss 1796) (making this argument
in the immediate post-ratification period).
34 See Ramsey, supra note 30, at 977–1004; see also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 300–17 (2007).
35 See Ramsey, supra note 30, at 977–83.
36 See id. at 983–96.
37 See id. at 996–1004.
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right treaty in hand, are endless and hardly farfetched.”38 As examples, he
suggests that the Court’s federalism decisions such as United States v. Lopez
could be “reversed by negotiating a treaty with Latvia providing that neither
sovereign would permit the carrying of guns near schools,”39 or that the federal government could regulate the laws of descent or prohibit state inheritance taxes.40 But the federal government would lack power to do these things
only if there was a subject matter limit on treatymaking power (because, if
not, it could do them by self-executing treaty, so long as the treaty was not a
sham). Once the power of a self-executing treaty to reach beyond enumerated powers is recognized, Congress’s power to enforce a non-self-executing
treaty is of less significance.
Scalia responds that some things are easier to do by non-self-executing
treaty and statute than by self-executing treaty, such as criminal prohibitions.41 That is surely true. But it does not seem decisive. Put this way, the
argument is only over whether the federal government’s power to legislate
beyond Congress’s enumerated powers should be somewhat further facilitated. That does not carry the structural force that Scalia needs to persuade
in the absence of a clear textual limit. Third, it follows from the prior point
that, to the Framers, a key limit on Congress’s treaty enforcement power was
the difficulty of obtaining consent for federalism-infringing treaties in the
first place. This was (we are assuming) the central consideration that made
the Framers comfortable with self-executing treaty power without subject
matter limitations.42 So long as Congress’s treaty enforcement power
extends only to validly enacted treaty provisions, Congress would be empowered to infringe on federalism values only with (in effect) the consent of twothirds of the representatives of the states. As with the treaty power itself,
Congress’s treaty enforcement power could be limited by subject matter (via
enumerated powers) or it could be limited by procedural protections (the
supermajority of the Senate). While there could be reasonable disagreement
whether the latter, standing alone, is sufficient, it is difficult to declare that
the Framers must have wanted both.43
38 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2100 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 2100–01.
41 Id.
42 See Ramsey, supra note 30, at 998 (“More important than the mere supermajority,
though, was the protection arising from the Senate’s composition. Under Article I, Section
3, ‘[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six years . . . .’ As a result, Senators owed their jobs
(and future re-election) to state legislatures, the entities most directly affected by federal
overreaching. The consequence, in turn, was that Senators could be expected to be especially sensitive to the states’ sovereignty-based concerns.”); see also id. at 999–1000 (demonstrating that the Senate was deliberately designed to protect state interests).
43 See id. at 1001 (making this argument in the context of the scope of the Treatymaking Clause); Vázquez, supra note 4, at 941 (“The[ ] concern that the Treaty Power will be
misused to circumvent the limitations the Constitution imposes on Congress’s legislative
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Fourth, there are competing structural concerns. As discussed in the
prior Section,44 the Framers’ experience under the Articles was that states
could not be trusted to uphold national treaty commitments. Solving that
problem was a central goal of the Constitution. Article VI solved it to some
extent. But the Framers might not have believed that Article VI was a complete solution. For one thing, as Scalia himself argues, it may sometimes be
easier to declare obligations in a somewhat open-ended way in a treaty and
rely on legislation for detailed implementation. Scalia sees this as a structural
argument against Congress’s treaty enforcement power, but in fact it cuts
both ways. The Constitution was designed in part to enhance the United
States’ ability to make and enforce treaties; locking the United States into a
self-execution-or-nothing approach would frustrate that goal. Perhaps the
Framers preferred more flexibility in treatymaking to an additional level of
protection for federalism.45
Further, as suggested above, non-self-execution-plus-implementation
might actually offer greater protections of federalism. Under that structure,
the United States can agree to open-ended treaty obligations and then take
into account federalism concerns in implementation without needing its
treaty partners’ consent. Thus Congress can decide, after a treaty is
approved, that implementation at the state level is sufficient and national
legislation is not needed (and the treaty partner need not agree).46 In contrast, under self-execution-or-nothing, the extent to which implementation
would be done at the national, instead of state, level would have to be
decided in the treaty itself. This might lead to fewer treaties, but it might also
lead to more interference with the states. Again, the competing structural
considerations are very difficult to assess.
In sum, structural considerations do not provide the compelling force
that Justice Scalia suggests. While it is true that granting Congress power to
enforce treaties would allow Congress to regulate matters beyond its otherpower is overstated given that such a ruse could succeed only if two-thirds of the Senate
went along with it. Article II’s supermajority requirement is a strong structural guarantee
that treaties will be concluded only if they would truly advance the foreign relations goals
of the nation.”). To be sure, the Framers’ structural protection of the states via the Senate
was substantially diluted by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment. See Ramsey,
supra note 30, at 1000 n.108.
44 See supra Section I.A.
45 A possible counterargument is that the Framers did not realize that treaties might
involve subject matter not within Congress’s enumerated powers. This is unlikely, however, because Congress’s powers probably did not extend generally to noncommercial
activities of aliens, and treatment of aliens was a common subject of treaties. The principal
early post-ratification debate over the scope of the treatymaking power concerned the Jay
Treaty, which provided favorable treatment of aliens in ways thought beyond Congress’s
other Article I, Section 8 powers. See Ramsey, supra note 30, at 992–96 (discussing the Jay
Treaty debates).
46 See Vázquez, supra note 4, at 956–57. For example, with regard to consular notification under the Vienna Convention, see supra note 24, Congress has not enacted enforcing
legislation (despite calls to do so), and so enforcement has been left by default to the
states, even in the face of foreign government protests.
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wise enumerated powers,47 it is not obvious that the Framers would have
thought this unacceptable. Rather, the structural considerations seem at
least evenly balanced.
II. LIMITING CONGRESS’S POWER

TO

ENFORCE TREATIES

The foregoing analysis suggests that while Congress does have a textual
power to enforce treaties, its power is appropriately subject to judicial limits.
In particular, Congress might misuse the treaty enforcement power by going
beyond what the Senate supermajority intended to permit when the Senate
approved the treaty. That is an especially worrisome concern because the
Senate’s power to protect federalism through its treaty approval power
appears to be the Constitution’s central check on overreaching both by treaties themselves and by congressional enforcement of treaties. In enforcing
treaties, Congress is in effect exercising a power delegated to it by the Senate
supermajority. If Congress goes beyond the treaty, it seizes power the Senate
supermajority did not intend to allow and thus circumvents the senatorial
check on its reach.
The most obvious conclusion is that the courts should look closely at the
match between the treaty obligations and Congress’s enforcement legislation; legislation that exceeds the scope of the treaty (and is not encompassed
within Congress’s other enumerated powers) should be found unconstitutional. Congress should not have independent power to interpret the treaty
(or even be accorded material deference) because of the concern that Congress, judging its own powers, would exceed the scope granted to it by the
Senate’s supermajority.
Courts might appropriately go beyond this role in two respects, discussed in more detail below. First, treaties may be ambiguous as to their
domestic reach. Because the Senate supermajority is a federalism-protecting
check on treatymaking power, ambiguous treaty provisions should be construed not to invade traditional powers of the states. This assures that Congress, in implementing the treaty, does not go beyond what the Senate has
approved. Second, even where the treaty is unambiguous and requires
47 Justice Scalia also implied—and some academic arguments claim more directly—
that allowing expansion of Congress’s enumerated powers by treaty is equivalent to
allowing a treaty to authorize violations of the Constitution’s individual rights protections.
See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
Eastman, supra note 4, at 195–96; Rosenkranz, Concurring in the Judgment, supra note 4, at
297; cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (finding that a treaty cannot contravene the
Constitution’s individual rights protections). The supposed equivalence seems misconceived. The principle of enumerated powers confirmed by the Tenth Amendment means
only that Congress must base its action on a delegated power. If the Constitution expressly
stated that Congress shall have power to implement treaties, that power would obviously
constitute a delegated power, and Congress could exercise it consistently with the Tenth
Amendment. Whether the power to implement treaties is a delegated power is the question to be decided. If it is a delegated power, there is no violation of the Tenth
Amendment.
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domestic implementation, it may be unclear whether the treaty can be implemented by the states or requires legislation at the national level. In this situation, the Constitution should favor the states. That is, we should not assume
the federalism-protecting Senate supermajority intended to authorize Congress to implement a treaty if implementation at the state level would be
sufficient to achieve the goals of the treaty. Put another way, in terms of the
Constitution’s text, congressional implementation is not “necessary and
proper” if state implementation is adequate. The next Sections elaborate
these limits with reference to the situation in Bond.
A. Treaty Interpretation and the Federalism Presumption
As discussed, the central structural check on Congress’s treaty enforcement power is the Senate supermajority required to approve a treaty in the
first place. It is this protection that allows comfort in the face of Scalia’s
complaint that Congress’s treaty enforcement power would destroy the structure of enumerated powers. Congress can go no further than a
supermajority of the Senate (under the original Constitution, appointed by
the states themselves) will allow.48
But this check is greatly diminished if the treaty is ambiguous. Congress
might adopt an expansive reading of the treaty not shared by the
supermajority that approved it. This concern suggests that an ambiguous
treaty should not be read to authorize incursions into areas otherwise
reserved for the states.
In Bond, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court majority, applied a
similar presumption to the statute (which he found, over Justice Scalia’s
objection, to be ambiguous).49 He expressly declined to consider whether a
similar presumption should be applied to the treaty (and if he was correct on
the statutory point, he did not need to reach the treaty question).50 But
several considerations suggest that a federalism presumption is more appropriately applied to the treaty.
First, as discussed above, the Senate supermajority is the Constitution’s
central check on treaty-based encroachments on federalism.51 Under the
original Constitution, the senators were selected by the state legislatures, so it
would have been surprising if a supermajority of them approved a treaty substantially encroaching on the states; only if the treaty was unambiguous could
an interpreter be confident that they did so. Put another way, if the treaty
has two plausible meanings, one of which intrudes on state power while the
other does not, it is most reasonable to conclude that the state-protecting
Senate, in approving the treaty, embraced the narrower meaning. (In con48 See supra Section I.B; see also Ramsey, supra note 30, at 999–1000.
49 See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086–94.
50 See id. at 2087–88 (observing that “[t]here is no reason to think the sovereign
nations that ratified the Convention were interested in anything like Bond’s common law
assault,” but ultimately finding that in light of the statutory conclusion “we have no need to
interpret the scope of the Convention in this case”).
51 See supra Section I.B.
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trast, the federalism presumption is less well grounded for ordinary legislation, which requires only a majority of the state-focused Senate and a
majority of the House, which owes no obvious allegiance to federalism.)
Admittedly the rationale underlying a federalism presumption for treaties
was weakened after the Seventeenth Amendment lessened the tie between
the states and the Senate. But because the Senate’s structural role as protector of federalism remains, maintaining the presumption—which clearly
would have been appropriate under the original Constitution—seems an
appropriate structural response.52
Second, also as discussed above, a separate check on the treatymaking
power is that treaties must be on matters of international concern.53 That
arises from the definition of treaty as an agreement among nations on matters affecting their mutual interest.54 As Justice Thomas argued in his separate concurrence, a pretextual treaty, adopted between the United States and
a compliant partner only for the purpose of expanding the federal government’s reach into areas of state control, would be unconstitutional.55
The difficulty with this check in practice is that it may be hard to say
categorically what matters are of international concern. Justice Thomas’s
concurrence can be read to suggest that only matters of international significance in the eighteenth century can be the subjects of treaties.56 But that
52 One might object that a treaty, as an international instrument, should not be interpreted according to parochial U.S. concerns because the other treaty parties would not
care about protecting U.S. federalism. Adopting U.S.-based interpretive rules increases the
risk of a U.S. interpretation that treaty partners view as a breach of the treaty’s obligations.
Increasing that risk seems contrary to the Framers’ goal of making the United States a
reliable treaty partner.
These objections seem insufficient on several grounds. If other countries consistently
take the view that a treaty has a broad, federalism-infringing meaning, that might be sufficient evidence to overcome the conclusion that the treaty is ambiguous. Further, if a treaty
is indeed ambiguous, reasonable disputes over its meaning are not likely to carry severe
reputational injury. Although the Framers wished to avoid clear violations of treaties, it is
not likely that they believed all disputes over treaty meaning could be avoided. In any
event, regardless of other countries’ views, the federalism presumption is premised on the
United States’ reluctance to agree to federalism-infringing terms.
A related point is that U.S. courts, when interpreting U.S. treaties, may deploy other
U.S.-focused interpretive conventions such as deference to interpretations of Congress or
of the executive branch. Because neither Congress nor the executive branch is likely to
have the federalism concerns of the Senate supermajority, these applications of deference—even if they are appropriate in other aspects of treaty interpretation—should not be
used to overcome the federalism presumption.
53 See supra Section I.B.
54 See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 338 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore
eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758) (giving this definition of treaty).
55 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Ramsey,
supra note 30, at 978–79.
56 Thomas’s concurrence is deliberately and appropriately tentative (because the issue
was not argued in the case), and could be read several ways. At one point, for example, he
says only that treaties cannot cover “matters without any nexus to foreign relations.” Bond,
134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). (I agree with this formula-
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seems inappropriate. Many things, though not of international concern in
1787, have become so now, such as basic human rights. Where countries
widely enter into treaties on a subject, it seems inescapable that as a practical
matter the subject is now a matter of international concern. And indeed, for
any particular treaty, it may be difficult to conclude that any matters it
expressly covers are not matters of international concern (unless the treaty
itself is a sham).
But again, treaties may be ambiguous. Under one reading, a treaty
might reach matters so tied to domestic interests that one might doubt they
are of international concern; on another reading the treaty might have more
limited scope, reaching only matters that no one would doubt concern all of
the treaty parties.
In such circumstances, the appropriate interpretive presumption is to
adopt the narrower reading. Because the broader reading brings within the
treaty matters that the treaty parties would not seem to care about, it is natural not to adopt that reading. Further, adopting the broader reading might
render the treaty unconstitutional under U.S. law, an interpretation to be
avoided.
Bond is an illustration. The question, from this perspective, is whether
the treaty imposed on the United States an obligation to prohibit Bond’s
conduct. If it did not, then an attempt by Congress to prohibit Bond’s conduct, under the authority of the treaty, would be unconstitutional. Quite
arguably, the treaty was ambiguous on this point—indeed, more so than the
statute.
To begin, there is the extreme doubt that Bond’s localized conduct had
any international implications.57 There was no indication of international
interest in Bond’s case.58 It is hard to imagine why any other nation would
concern itself over how Bond’s prosecution was handled. More broadly, it is
hard to imagine any nation showing interest in how any such local crime is
handled. To be sure, in the modern world, some things that seem very localized (such as a nation’s application of the death penalty to one of its own
citizens) have an international moral dimension that can make them matters
of international concern. For this reason, a categorical approach to the question, as Justice Thomas seemed to suggest, is impractical. Whether a matter
tion. See Ramsey, supra note 30, at 978–79.) Elsewhere, though, he suggests that treaties
could cover only “genuinely international matters such as war, peace, and trade between
nations,” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2104 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), or that they
be “limited to matters of international intercourse,” id. at 2108. This language might be
read to exclude areas of purely domestic regulation, even if foreign nations were (as a
factual matter) interested in those areas. See also id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment) (stating “that the treaty power is limited to agreements that address matters of
legitimate international concern” without explaining how to determine what matters are of
“legitimate” international concern).
57 Bond used small amounts of chemicals obtained from her workplace and through
the mail to slightly injure a romantic rival. See id. at 2085 (majority opinion).
58 See id. at 2087 (finding “no reason to think the sovereign nations that ratified the
Convention were interested in anything like Bond’s common law assault”).
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is one of international concern is a factual question. But irrespective of the
fact that some local actions have international implications, there is no indication that Bond’s actions did.
Second, the Convention’s language (especially taken with its context) is
itself confusing. As the majority opinion in Bond outlined, the Convention
arose from concerns about the use of chemical weapons in wartime.59 The
Convention principally describes restrictions on the actions of the nations
who join it. Nations are, among other things, restricted from using, developing, or stockpiling “chemical weapons.”60 Chemical weapons are defined as
toxic chemicals that are (among other things) not used for “[i]ndustrial,
agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.”61 In this context, the opposite of “peaceful” seems most obviously to
be “warlike”—connecting with the ordinary idea of chemical weapons as
something used by nations to fight wars (either externally or against their
own population). So far, this language makes sense as an international
obligation.
The Convention then adds, in Article 7, that nations must prohibit individuals from doing what the Convention prohibits nations from doing:
Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes,
adopt the necessary measures to . . . [p]rohibit natural and legal persons
anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with
respect to such activity . . . .62

This approach raises substantial ambiguity. Obviously, Article 7 means
that individuals must be prohibited from using chemicals in the way nations
are prohibited from using them—that is, as weapons of war. So an individual
working on behalf of a government, who uses chemicals as a weapon against
its enemies, must be punished. Similarly, an individual who, though not
working for a government, uses chemicals as a weapon in the way a nation
would—for example, as an instrument of mass terrorism—must be punished.
Again, all this is readily understandable in terms of the goals and context of
the Convention.
Does Article 7 also mean that individuals must be prohibited from any
harmful use of a chemical in their private lives? That depends on the meaning of the clause tying the individual prohibition to uses prohibited to
nations. One view is that indeed it includes any harmful use of a chemical.
59 Id.
60 See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 24, art. I., para. 1 (“Each State Party
to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: (a) To develop, produce,
otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly,
chemical weapons to anyone; (b) To use chemical weapons; (c) To engage in any military
preparations to use chemical weapons; (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way,
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”).
61 Id. art. II, paras. 1, 9.
62 Id. art. 7.
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But alternatively, it might mean only a harmful use of a chemical in the way a
nation would use it—that is, as an instrument of public warfare. A private
quarrel, as in Bond, has no counterpart in the actions of nations. Put another
way, Bond’s use of chemicals was arguably “peaceful” because it did not disturb the peace of nations. Because the individual prohibition is tied to the
national prohibition, it is unclear how that translates to purely private
action.63
I would resolve this ambiguity against the broader, federalism-harming
reading. Before allowing Congress to reach Bond’s conduct, we need to be
sure the Senate supermajority that adopted the treaty authorized Congress to
do so. Where the treaty language is ambiguous, and where reaching Bond’s
conduct would interfere with federalism values, the narrower reading of the
treaty should be preferred.
B. Treaty Enforcement and the Federalism Limitation
Where a treaty unambiguously covers an area not otherwise within Congress’s enumerated powers, a further limitation is appropriate. Because the
United States is a federal system, a treaty that requires legislative implementation does not require that implementation be done at the national level. If
the states’ responses to a treaty are adequate, in the sense of not threatening
international difficulties, there is no need for Congress to be involved. The
reliability of the United States as a treaty partner will not be at stake so long
as the states act appropriately. If that is the case, it negates the predicate for
congressional action under its power to carry into execution the treatymaking power: the treatymaking power will remain unimpaired even if Congress
does not act. We are by definition addressing subject matters that are in
other respects reserved to the states (because they are outside Congress’s otherwise enumerated powers), so there should be some hesitation in allowing
63 The statute is less ambiguous. It does not tie the individual prohibition to the governmental prohibition. Rather, it simply declares the individual prohibition directly. See
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012) (forbidding any person knowingly “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical
weapon”). Although the statute (similar to the Convention) has an exception for “peaceful activity,” see id. § 229F(7)(A), the ambiguity is less apparent when addressing individual
action. An individual’s action is more readily described a peaceful when it is not violent; a
nation’s action is more readily described as peaceful when it is not warlike. Further, Justice
Scalia directly addressed and rejected the “peaceful activity” argument by pointing out that
the statute contains an exception for using chemicals in self-defense. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at
2094 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 229C provides an
exception for any individual self-defense device, including pepper spray or chemical
mace). Thus, he argued, the statute appears to cover private activity (otherwise the exception would not be needed). However, the Convention does not have this exception, suggesting that either the treaty parties intended to prohibit using chemicals for private selfdefense (an unlikely conclusion) or that the treaty did not reach local private activity.
Thus, even if Justice Scalia was right that the statute was unambiguous, a different conclusion can be drawn for the treaty.
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congressional action. As a result, only if states are unwilling or unable to
implement a treaty is Congress’s intervention necessary and proper to carry
into execution the treatymaking power.64
Adopting this approach preserves the Framers’ commitment to federalism and enumerated powers, as well as to treaty enforcement. To the extent
there is a material concern with treaty violations, Congress will have power to
intervene, even at the cost of expanding national power into areas otherwise
reserved to the states. But where there is no concern with treaty violation,
federalism should be favored over congressional power.
A key question, of course, is how closely to scrutinize a congressional
determination that states are not adequately enforcing a treaty. Arguably,
courts are not in a good position to assess potential international implications of state actions or non-actions, as compared to Congress or (especially)
the executive branch. Further, at least since McCulloch v. Maryland,65 Congress’s power to act as “necessary” to carry into effect another constitutional
power does not require Congress to show absolute necessity (that is, that
there is no other alternative).66 Rather, Congress is understood to have considerable flexibility in assessing the necessity of an action. As a result, there
may be reasonable debate about how far courts should go in overriding a
reasonable congressional determination.
In Bond’s case, though, there seems to be no need for congressional
intervention even under relatively minimal scrutiny. Using chemicals to
harm another person in a private dispute is presumably illegal under all state
laws. It was illegal under applicable Pennsylvania law in Bond.67 It is true
that Pennsylvania decided, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, to bring
only a minor charge against Bond, consistent with the state’s assessment of
the minimal aspect of the threat and injury.68 In a sense, perhaps one could
say that the treaty was being underenforced. But the treaty (even assuming it
applied to Bond’s conduct) surely encompassed some idea of prosecutorial
64 A related limit has been suggested by Professor Carlos Vázquez. See Vázquez, supra
note 4, at 941–42 (“[T]he power to implement treaties under the Necessary and Proper
clause is the power to require compliance with treaty obligations. Because aspirational
treaty provisions do not impose obligations in any meaningful sense of the term, the clause
does not give Congress the power to implement such provisions. If such provisions concern matters otherwise beyond Congress’s legislative powers, the Constitution leaves their
implementation to the States. This approach is consistent with the Founders’ design
because the Constitution reflects the Founders’ fear of treaty violations by States, and only
obligatory provisions can be violated.”); id. at 964–67 (further developing this position and
giving the example of the UN Charter’s direction that member nations promote human
rights). From this Article’s perspective, Professor Vázquez’s position is correct because
implementing aspirational treaties is not necessary to preserve the United States’ international reputation for adhering to treaty obligations, and thus is not necessary to carry into
execution the treatymaking power.
65 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
66 See Cleveland & Dodge, supra note 14 (manuscript at 79–81) (taking a broad view of
“necessary” in the context of treaty enforcement).
67 See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092.
68 See id. at 2092–93.
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discretion, which could be applied at the state or national level. I am not
aware of any evidence that any other nation was upset by Pennsylvania’s failure to aggressively prosecute Bond, or that any other nation was even paying
attention to the case.69 Similarly, I am not aware that the United States had
expressed concern about any other nation underenforcing the Convention
in parallel circumstances. As a result, there was no prospect that state inaction in Bond, or even in a run of similar cases, would have any international
implications or any effects on U.S. treaty-enforcing credibility.70
In these circumstances, even under a relatively deferential review, the
appropriate conclusion should be that Congress’s intervention into local private misuse of chemicals is not necessary and proper to carry into execution
the treatymaking power. This approach is distinct from both the majority
opinion in Bond and Justice Scalia’s concurrence. The majority makes many
of the same points regarding the lack of necessity for federal intervention.71
But it does so only to support a presumption against reading the statute
broadly; it does not say what would happen if the statute were unambiguous.
Under the approach proposed here, even an unambiguous statute would be
unconstitutional if it were (a) otherwise outside Congress’s enumerated powers and (b) not plausibly needed to assure adequate enforcement of a treaty.
Justice Scalia’s approach, in contrast, goes further in prohibiting Congress
from acting even where (a) a matter outside Congress’s enumerated powers
is legitimately a matter of international concern and unambiguously incorporated into a treaty and (b) federal intervention is necessary to assure U.S.
compliance because states refuse to enforce the treaty. His approach is not
required by the Constitution’s text and is inconsistent with the Framers’
desire to assure treaty enforcement.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Bond raises a valid structural concern. If Congress has unlimited power to enforce U.S. treaties, even outside
of its enumerated powers, the Constitution’s structure of limited and enumerated federal powers may be at risk. The risk does not, however, arise
directly from the scope of the treatymaking power. While the treatymaking
power is not limited by subject matter, it is limited principally by the require69 No country filed an amicus brief in the case. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-158.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (listing briefs filed).
70 In contrast, in the Vienna Convention situation discussed above, see supra note 24,
there was broad evidence that states’ failure to follow Convention prescriptions regarding
consular notification was creating international concerns; it had been the source of diplomatic protests and arguments in court by foreign nations. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
548 U.S. 331, 352–53 (2006). Under these circumstances, Congress would be authorized
by the Convention to intervene into state criminal procedure, even if that action was
beyond its otherwise enumerated powers.
71 See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092–93 (discussing the adequacy of Pennsylvania’s
response).
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ment that treaties receive the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. So long as
Congress’s power to enforce treaties is closely tied to treaty obligations clearly
adopted by two-thirds of the Senate, Congress also operates under this limitation. The structural difficulty arises only if Congress attempts treaty enforcement in ways not authorized by the Senate supermajority.
As a result, in barring Congress from enforcing treaty obligations altogether, Scalia adopts too broad a rule. Constitutional structure (on which
Scalia chiefly relies) does not compel it, because a congressional treaty
enforcement power can be limited by tying it closely to the treaty, and thus to
the requirement of supermajority Senate approval. Further, the rule is not
compelled by the Constitution’s text, which gives Congress power to make
laws that are necessary and proper to carry into execution the treatymaking
power. As argued above, a viable treatymaking power depends, among other
things, on the United States’ reputation for honoring its treaty obligations; as
the Framers knew well from experience under the Articles, other nations see
little point in making treaties with nations that do not (or cannot) keep their
promises. Thus, when Congress acts to assure U.S. compliance with treaty
obligations, it reinforces the United States’ power to make future treaties.
Nonetheless, the structural concerns Scalia raises indicate the importance of limits on Congress’s power to enforce treaties. If Congress can
decide for itself what a treaty requires, the threat to the enumerated powers
structure is substantial. The foregoing discussion suggests two limits. First,
there should be a federalism presumption in treaty interpretation. Treaties
are by definition agreements among nations on matters of international concern. As a result, they should not be read to reach matters that seem purely
domestic. Although some matters that may seem purely domestic have taken
on international dimensions, in the case of ambiguity, the presumption
should be that domestic matters remain domestic. And Congress’s enforcement powers, of course, should not extend beyond the obligations imposed
by the treaty.
Second, even if a treaty is unambiguous, its obligations do not necessarily need to be enforced by Congress. It may be the case that they can adequately be enforced by the states. Where the obligations concern matters
traditionally regulated by the states (especially those outside Congress’s enumerated powers) the presumption should be that state enforcement is adequate and was understood as sufficient by the President and Senate when
adopting the treaty. Congress’s treaty enforcement power arises only where
state enforcement is inadequate.
Bond illustrates both limitations. As to the first, the federal government
interpreted the Chemical Weapons Convention to reach local, private misuse
of chemicals, apparently a purely domestic matter. Using a federalism presumption in treaty interpretation, that reading should be rejected if there is
an alternate reading of the treaty. As argued above, the treaty seems ambiguous on this point (at least as much, and probably more so, than the implementing statute). The treaty could plausibly be read to cover only the
preparation and use of chemicals in a way that would disturb the peace
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among nations—a reading that would limit it to matters of obvious international concern. Thus, that reading should be preferred. As to the second
limitation, even if the treaty were unambiguous, there was no evidence in
Bond that, as to local, private misuse of chemicals, state regulation was inadequate to enforce U.S. treaty obligations. In that situation, Congress’s limited
power of treaty enforcement should not permit Congress to displace the
states from an area otherwise reserved to them by the Constitution.

